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Abstract
We show that the full version of the so-called ‘rural hospital theorem’ (Roth, 1986)
generalizes to many-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market
have separable and substitutable preferences.
Keywords: matching, many-to-many, stability, rural hospital theorem.
JEL–Numbers: C78, D60.
1 Introduction
In many entry-level labor markets, workers are matched with firms through a clearing-
house. It has been shown that clearinghouses that employ so-called stable mechanisms
perform better than those that employ unstable mechanisms.1 Stability guarantees that
parties cannot profitably recontract from the matching established by the mechanism.
Taking the requirement of stability as granted, an important question is whether the
choice of a particular stable mechanism affects the numerical distribution of workers; and
if not, whether it affects the composition of the firms that do not fill all their vacant
positions. For instance, Sudarshan and Zisook (1981) observed that in the US market
of medical graduates the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) fails to fill the
posts of many rural hospitals. Roth (1984,1986) showed that the problem of the rural
hospitals cannot be attributed to NRMP’s particular stable mechanism. More precisely,
any other stable mechanism would yield (R1) the same numerical distribution of medical
interns and would assign (R2) the same interns to each rural hospital that does not fill
all its posts.
Roth (1984,1986) established his two findings for many-to-one markets (i.e., each firm
can hire multiple workers) with so-called responsive preferences. The two results are now
known as the ‘rural hospital theorem.’ Under the (standard) assumption of substitutable
preferences,2 several papers have extended both parts of the theorem. Concerning the
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many-to-one framework, Alkan (2002) extended (R1) to cardinally monotonic preferences,
and Mart´ınez et al. (2000) extended (R2) to separable preferences. The examples of
Mart´ınez et al. (2000, Example 5) and Kojima (2011, Example 1) show that the two
properties do not necessarily hold if one agent has (substitutable) preferences that do not
pertain to the corresponding domain.
In the many-to-many framework (where each worker can be employed by multiple
firms), (R1) still holds on Alkan’s (2002) domain of cardinally monotonic preferences.
However, (R2) was only established for the domain of responsive preferences (Alkan, 1999).
Here, we show that in fact (R2) also holds on the strictly larger domain of separable pref-
erences (as in the many-to-one case). Our short proof is based on a strong but apparently
slightly overlooked structural result regarding the set of pairwise stable matchings by
Roth (1984).
In Section 2, we present the model and the preference domains. In Section 3, we
discuss the literature on the rural hospital theorem and prove our result.
2 Model
There are two disjoint and finite sets of agents: a set of workers W and a set of firms
F . Let A = W ∪ F denote the set of agents. A generic worker, firm, and agent are
denoted by w, f , and a, respectively. The preferences of a worker w (firm f) are given
by a linear order Pw (Pf) over Sw ≡ 2
F (Sf ≡ 2
W ). For each agent a, let qa ≥ 1 (its
‘quota’) be the smallest positive integer qa ≥ 1 such that for any S ⊆ Sa with |S| > qa,
∅Pa S.
3 A preference profile is a tuple P = (Pa)a∈A. For any S ⊆ Sa, let Ch(S, Pa) denote
agent a’s most preferred subset of S according to Pa. Throughout, we make the following
(standard) assumption on each agent a’s linear order Pa.
Substitutability. For any b, c ∈ S ⊆ Sa with b 6= c, [b ∈ Ch(S, Pa)⇒ b ∈ Ch(S\c, Pa)].
A matching µ is a mapping from A into 2F ∪2W such that for all a, a′ ∈ A, µ(a) ∈ 2Sa
and [a ∈ µ(a′) ⇔ a′ ∈ µ(a)]. Matching µ is blocked by agent a if µ(a) 6= Ch(µ(a), Pa).
Matching µ is blocked by a worker-firm pair (w, f) if w 6∈ µ(f), w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ w, Pf),
and f ∈ Ch(µ(w) ∪ f, Pw). A matching is (pairwise) stable if it is not blocked by any
agent or worker-firm pair.4
For any profile of substitutable preferences P , the set of stable matchings S(P ) is non-
empty. Roth (1984, Theorem 2) showed the existence of a firm-optimal stable matching
µF (which all firms like at least as well as any other stable matching) and likewise a
worker-optimal stable matching µW . In fact, the set of stable matchings satisfies the
following properties (which will be key in the proof of our result).
Theorem 1. [Roth (1984, Theorem 2)]
Let P be substitutable. Let µ ∈ S(P ). For all w ∈W and f ∈ F ,
3The interpretation is that agent a can definitely not hire/work for more than qa agents from the
other side of the market. Note that for any q′
a
≥ |Sa|, [S ⊆ Sa with |S| > q′a implies ∅Pa S] trivially.
4Note that we do not consider larger blocking coalitions. It is well-known that restricting blocking
power to individual agents and worker-firm pairs is not without loss of generality. However, Roth and
Sotomayor (1990, page 157) pointed out that for certain many-to-many markets pairwise stability is still
of primary importance. Giving blocking power to larger coalitions would lead to a subset of pairwise
stable matchings for which our result still holds.
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(i). Ch(µF (f) ∪ µ(f), Pf) = µF (f);
(ii). Ch(µW (w) ∪ µ(w), Pw) = µW (w).
The matching literature has studied the following preference domains.
Responsiveness.5
For any S ⊆ Sa with |S| < qa and for any b, c ∈ (Sa\S) ∪ {∅}, [(S ∪ b)Pa(S ∪ c)⇔ bPac].
Separability.6
For any S ⊆ Sa with |S| < qa and for any b ∈ Sa\S, [(S ∪ b)PaS ⇔ bPa∅].
Cardinal Monotonicity.7
For any S, S ′ ⊆ Sa, [S ⊆ S
′ ⇒ |Ch(S, Pa)| ≤ |Ch(S
′, Pa)|].
Figure 1 illustrates (1) the strict inclusion relationships between the latter three preference
domains (responsiveness implies separability and separability implies cardinal monotonic-
ity), and (2) the absence of inclusion relationship with respect to substitutability.8
cardinally monotonic
responsive
separable
substitutable
Figure 1: Preference domains
3 Result
The matching literature established the (first or both of the) next two results for different
preference domains:
Rural Hospital Theorem.
R1. For all µ, µ′ ∈ S(P ) and a ∈ A, |µ(a)| = |µ′(a)|;
R2. For all µ, µ′ ∈ S(P ) and a ∈ A, |µ(a)| < qa ⇒ µ(a) = µ
′(a).
For one-to-one matching, each agent’s preferences are responsive with quota 1, and R1 and
R2 are equivalent. R1 and/or R2 were established for different (substitutable) preference
domains:9
5Responsiveness was first formalized by Roth (1985).
6Separability was introduced by Mart´ınez et al. (2000). Separability alone (i.e., without substitutabil-
ity) does not guarantee the existence of a stable matching (Mart´ınez et al. 2000, Example 1).
7Cardinal monotonicity was introduced by Alkan (2002). It is called size monotonicity and law of
aggregate demand by Alkan and Demange (2003) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), respectively.
8For instance, the linear order P (f) = {w1, w2, w3}, {w2, w3}, {w1, w2}, {w1, w3}, {w3}, {w2}, {w1}, ∅
is separable (and substitutable) but not responsive.
9The list is not exhaustive. First, only the papers that established the most general results concerning
R1 or R2 are mentioned. Second, the literature on ‘generalized two-sided matching’ established similar or
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One-to-one: R1≡R2: McVitie and Wilson (1970), Gale and Sotomayor (1985a,b)
Many-to-one:10
{
R1: firms w. cardinally monotonic preferences: Alkan (2002) (⋆)
R2: firms w. separable preferences: Mart´ınez et al. (2000) (⋆⋆)
Many-to-many:
{
R1: cardinally monotonic preferences: Alkan (2002) (⋆)
R2: reponsive preferences: Alkan (1999)
Here, (⋆) and (⋆⋆) refer to the following two examples which complement the results.
(⋆) Mart´ınez et al. (2000, Example 5): a many-to-one market where one firm’s (sub-
stitutable) preferences violate cardinal monotonicity, the other agents have responsive
preferences, and for which R1 does not hold.
(⋆⋆) Kojima (2011, Example 1): a many-to-one market where one firm has cardinally
monotonic (and substitutable) preferences that are not separable, the other agents have
responsive preferences, and for which R2 does not hold.11
For many-to-many matching, R2 was only shown to hold for responsive preferences.
Below we show that R2 even holds for separable (and substitutable) preferences, i.e., the
most general preference domain for which R2 has been established in the many-to-one
framework. The proof utilizes the structural result Theorem 1.12
Theorem 2. For many-to-many matching, R2 holds for all profiles P of separable (and
substitutable) preferences.
Proof. Since R1 holds for P , it suffices to show that for any f ∈ F with |µF (f)| < qf ,
µ(f) ⊆ µF (f). (Similar arguments can be used to show that for any w ∈ W with
|µW (w)| < qw, µ(w) ⊆ µW (w).)
Let f ∈ F with |µF (f)| < qf . Suppose µ(f) 6⊆ µF (f). Then, there exists w ∈ µ(f)
with w 6∈ µF (f). Suppose wPf ∅. Then, from separability and |µF (f)| < qf it follows
that
(µF (f) ∪ w)Pf µF (f)
Th.1(i)
====== Ch(µF (f) ∪ µ(f), Pf),
which, since w ∈ µ(f), contradicts the definition of Ch.
Now suppose ∅Pf w. Then, by separability and w ∈ µ(f),
(µ(f)\w)Pf µ(f),
which implies that f blocks µ, in contradiction to µ ∈ S(P ). Hence, µ(f) ⊆ µF (f).
more general results than R1 in Alkan (2002); see, for instance, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), Hatfield and
Kojima (2010), and Hatfield and Kominers (2011). However, in the context of ‘classical matching’ these
results are implied by or coincide with Alkan’s (2002) result. Below we also comment on Kojima (2011).
11Kojima (2011) also introduced the domain of separable preferences with so-called affirmative action
constraints. This domain is a strict superset of the domain of separable preferences but a strict sub-
set of the domain of cardinally monotonic preferences. Kojima (2011) showed that on his domain an
appropriately adjusted version of R2 holds.
12In fact, for separable preferences R1 easily follows from Remark 1 in Mart´ınez et al. (2004) which
consists of Theorem 1 and two related results from Blair (1988). Details are available upon request from
the author but omitted here since Alkan (2002) showed R1 for the strictly larger domain of cardinally
monotonic preferences.
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